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ARTICLE 
Finding Opportunities to Combat the Climate 
Change Migration Crisis: The Potential of the 
“Adaptation Approach”1 
 
MARIYA GROMILOVA 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The time when climate change was primarily the concern of 
scientists is long gone. Today, the “human face” of climate change 
is visible to the world through the many people that suffer its 
consequences, such as sea-level rise, droughts, cyclones, and 
tsunamis. These impacts present a threat to lives and livelihoods 
and will induce millions of people to move, some of them 
permanently. Though the evidence of this phenomenon remains 
 
 1. This article builds upon my previous research conducted as a part of my 
doctorate dissertation and finalises my research project. The preceding 
publications: MARIYA GROMILOVA & NICOLA JÄGERS, Climate Change Induced 
Displacement and International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND ADAPTATION LAW (Edward Elgar & Johann Verschuuren eds. 2013); 
Mariya Gromilova, Can the EU Seasonal Workers Directive Alleviate the 
Pending Crisis of Climate-induced Displacement? Lessons from Oceania, EUR. 
LAB. L. J. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Lessons from Oceania]; Mariya Gromilova, 
Rescuing Tuvaluans: Towards an ICJ Advisory Opinion on the International 
Legal Obligations to Protect the Environment and Human Rights of Populations 
Affected by Climate Change, 10 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, (2015) 
[hereinafter Rescuing Tuvaluans]; Mariya Gromilova, Revisiting Planned 
Relocation as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy: The Added Value of a 
Human Rights-Based Approach, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 76 (2014) [hereinafter 
Revisiting Planned Relocation]. 
 PhD Researcher, Department of European and International Public Law, 
Tilburg Law School, Tilburg Sustainability Centre, the Netherlands; email: 
M.Gromilova@uvt.nl. 
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limited, in its Fifth Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is in the high agreement that 
climate change will increase the displacement of people over the 
course of the 21st Century.2  Due to the fact that climate change-
related impacts are to a large extent irreversible, adaptation 
might be the only available and appropriate response, according 
to the IPCC.3 
Given the scope and turbulence of the issue, the topic of 
climate change migration is unsurprisingly high on the agenda of 
politicians and academics. The issue is multifaceted and 
continuingly challenges with fundamental questions such as: 
what is happening and where? How many people will have to 
move? Where will they go? Who is responsible for helping them? 
What is their legal status, etc.? 
The attempts to generate knowledge and reach 
understanding in order to answer these questions are numerous. 
Regardless of the efforts of empirical research groups, political 
lobbying, research institutes, international organizations and 
NGOs, the success is poor. International law is also of little help, 
since there are normative gaps that prevent people induced to 
move by climate change from being considered under existing 
frameworks or from acquiring a defined legal status; these gaps 
also prevent the establishment of a mechanism or mechanisms 
for their protection.4  The conceptual difficulties, from both 
 
 2. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 
20 (2014) [hereinafter IPCC 2014]. 
 3. By “irreversible” it is meant that even when all the GHG emissions be 
stopped today, the marginal changes will be seen only in 30–40 years. See 
GROMILOVA & JÄGERS, supra note 1, at 1; see also Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, 
at 19 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC 2007]. 
 4. Oli Brown, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, PUB. NO. 31, MIGRATION AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 36 (2008); Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a 
Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate 
Refugees, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 60, 63 (2010) [hereinafter Preparing for a 
Warmer World]; David Hodgkinson et al., The Hour When the Ship Comes in: A 
Convention for Persons Displaced by Climate Change, 36 MONASH U. L. REV. 69, 
75–77 (2010); see also GROMILOVA & JÄGERS, supra note 1; Frank Biermann & 
Ingrid Boas, Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol, ENV’T: 
SCI & POL’Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 11 (2008), 
http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/November-
December%202008/Biermann-Boas-full.html [http://perma.cc/PRZ7-WLP4] 
[hereinafter Protecting Climate Refugees]; Jekwu Ikeme, Equity, Environmental 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/1
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theoretical and legal perspectives, are multiple and originate in 
the complex nature of the phenomenon. 
However, apart from many limitations of law, politics, and 
scientific and technological progress, the debates on climate-
induced population movement have achieved several significant 
results that offer opportunities. Some of them are yet to be seen 
(the negotiations in Paris and potential inclusion in its outcome-
document of the commitment for the developed states to “[a]ssist[] 
in providing organized migration and planned relocation” due to 
climate change),5 while others have already gained support 
amongst policy-makers and academics. This is the case for the 
2010 Cancun Adaptation Agreement, which differentiated 
between different types of climate change-induced mobility by 
acknowledging migration, induced displacement, and planned 
relocation as climate change adaptation strategies; the 
Agreement invited the Parties to enhance understanding and 
cooperation with regard to these adaptation strategies.6  The 
Cancun Adaptation Framework reemphasized the obligation of 
adaptation under Article 4(1)(b) of the U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and invited Parties to 
cooperate regarding specific actions on the national, regional, and 
international levels when it comes to the issue of population 
movement due to climate change.7  It has also suggested for the 
first time that migration, displacement, and planned relocation 
can become part of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).8  As Kälin 
and Schrepfer put it, the Cancun Adaptation Agreement is “the 
 
Justice and Sustainability: Incomplete Approaches in Climate Change Politics, 
13 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 195 (2003). 
 5. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/ADP/2015/1, at 32 (Feb. 25, 2015), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/ 
adp2/eng/01.pdf [https://perma.cc/89TD-FN4A] [hereinafter Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action]. 
 6. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties 
on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 
2010, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter 
Cancun Agreements]. 
 7. See generally id. 
 8. Id. ¶ 14; see also Walter Kälin & Nina Schrepfer, U.N. High Comm’r for 
Refugees, Protecting People Crossing Boarders in the Context of Climate Change: 
Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2012/01, at 49–50 
(2012). 
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most important step thus far” made at the international level 
regarding the issue of climate-induced population movement.9 
The Cancun Agreement is a non-binding instrument included 
within the UNFCCC framework, which nevertheless has 
implications that go far beyond the single agreement. As I argue 
here, viewing an issue of climate-induced population movement 
as a matter of adaptation, i.e., approaching it through the 
adaptation approach, allows us to integrate the opportunities 
offered by other relevant legal regimes. This ultimately allows us 
to breach the normative gaps peculiar to fragmented 
international law and conceptualize the complex issue of climate-
induced population movement. 
The aim of this article is to demonstrate the benefits of 
applying adaptation approach in conceptualising the issue of 
climate-induced population movement and its potential to 
respond to the main priorities to be addressed in the context of 
population movement induced by climate change. This article 
proceeds with Section 2, which provides an overview of the main 
difficulties to conceptualization of the issue of climate induced 
population movement from empirical and legal perspectives. 
Section 3, drawing upon the state of play presented above, 
identifies the main priorities that have to be addressed. Section 4 
focuses on the opportunities the Cancun Adaptation Agreement 
offers. First, however, I assess in this section the benefits of 
treating population movement as a matter of adaptation to find 
out how the adaptation approach can be utilized to integrate 
relevant provisions of various legal frameworks and how an 
effective response to the pending climate migration crisis can be 
developed and implemented. 
A.  Definitions 
The two basic concepts used throughout the article are 
“climate-induced population movement” and “adaptation 
approach to climate-induced population movement.” 
Climate-induced population movement: This is the term 
used throughout this article, and stands for a movement of 
persons in response to climate change impacts (both sudden-onset 
 
 9. Id. at 49. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/1
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and slow-onset) of both temporary and permanent character in 
the form of migration, induced-displacement, or planned 
relocation. 
Adaptation approach to climate-induced population 
movement: Adaptation, when it comes to people, is understood as 
“the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its 
effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial 
opportunities.”10  When it comes to adaptation in the context of 
climate-induced population movement, the Cancun Adaptation 
Framework expressed that migration, induced-displacement, and 
planned relocation can be this general adjustment.11  The 
adaptation approach to climate-induced population movement is 
defined, for the purpose of this article, as a proactive approach in 
which migration, induced-displacement, and planned relocation 
are used as adaptation measures that allow people to adjust to 
changing climate by moving from places at risk. 
 
II.  STATE OF PLAY AND DIFFICULTIES IN 
CONCEPTUALIZATION 
 
Population movement in response to climate change has been 
under the spotlight of politicians and academics for at least the 
last decade.12  The predictions on the scale and the magnitude of 
the issue are quite alarming, and, depending on the perception of 
climate change as a factor for migration, range between 25 
million and 1 billion.13  There is agreement that climate change 
 
 10. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Managing the Risks of 
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, 
Annex II: Glossary of Terms, at 556 (2012). 
 11. See Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 14(f). 
 12. ÉTIENNE PIGUET ET AL., MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 2–6 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2011). 
 13. See U.N. Secretary-General, Climate Change and its Possible Security 
Implications, ¶ 54, U.N. Doc. A/64/350 (Sept. 11, 2009); CHRISTIAN AID, THE 
HUMAN TIDE: THE REAL MIGRATION CRISIS 22 (2007); Norman Myers, 
Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World, 43 BIOSCIENCE 752, 757 
(2003); Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Accommodating Migration to Promote 
Adaptation to Climate Change 14–15 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 5270, 
2010); François Gemenne, Environmental Changes and Migration Flows: 
Normative Frameworks and Policy Responses 158 (Apr. 3, 2009) (unpublished 
5
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will most severely affect people from the developing and least-
developed countries, already vulnerable, most depended on 
natural capital, and with the least financial and physical capacity 
to adapt to climate change.14  Ironically, these people most 
affected by climate change are also the least responsible for 
emissions of greenhouse gases.15  This suggests that countries 
affected by climate change will probably not be able to manage 
the problem without assistance, and also that there is at least a 
moral obligation on the part of those who have contributed to 
climate change to provide assistance. While there is a debate as 
to whether this assistance is a legal obligation or is entirely 
voluntary, it is in fact in the best interests of the developed 
countries to provide assistance.16  Unmanaged, sporadic, last 
minute movements are associated with multiple risks, including 
political and economic instability, security concerns, and 
widespread human rights implications not only for those who are 
induced to move but also for receiving and neighbouring areas.17 
This complex state of play, and the fundamental questions it 
puts forward, demands answers and solutions. There are, 
however, numerous difficulties in conceptualizing the issue from 
both empirical and legal perspectives. 
A.  Issue of Causation 
First, there is the fundamental issue of causation. The 
empirical studies that have been undertaken show the complexity 
of the relationship between environmental factors and 
migration.18  Climate change is only one factor among several 
 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Liège), for different estimations and two 
different schools of thoughts (maximalists and minimalists). 
 14. Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities 
and Limits, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES 37, 39 (Jane McAdam ed., Hart Publ’g, 2010) [hereinafter 
Migration as Adaptation]; see also Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 4–5. 
 15. Brown, supra note 4, at 31. 
 16. GROMILOVA & JÄGERS, supra note 1, at 77, 94–96. 
 17. See Brendan Gogarty, Climate-Change Displacement: Current Legal 
Solutions to Future Global Problems, J.L. INFO. & SCI., Dec. 2011, at 176–77. 
 18. See Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-
FOR), CLIMATE CHANGE, ENV’T & MIGRATION ALLIANCE, http://www.ccema-
portal.org/article/read/each-for-project-publications [http://perma.cc/2JUG-
BVBW] [hereinafter CCEMA] (“EACH-FOR was a two year long research project 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/1
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others in explaining migration dynamics,19 and is closely linked 
to economic, political, and social factors.20 Therefore, 
environmental degradation is undoubtedly a driver of 
displacement, but it is unlikely that it is the unique cause, as 
other conditions, such as labour market opportunities, are always 
taken into account in people’s decisions to migrate.21  Causation 
is even more complex when personal perceptions of risks, 
vulnerability, and the capacity to adapt are taken into account.22  
Therefore, long and heated discussions on causation allow us, at 
best, to conclude that environmental degradation is an “impact 
multiplier and accelerator to other drivers of human mobility” 
rather than a predominant cause for migration.23  Furthermore, 
as Etienne Piguet et al. argues, environmental factors are not 
only intertwined with other factors for decisions to migrate but 
can also be a cause or effect of other factor that gives a totally 
different conceptual context to the problem.24  This is the case 
with migration in response to the conflict over scarce resources, 
for example. 
Due to the uncertainties in the understanding of causation it 
is hard to identify the magnitude of the phenomena, estimate the 
number of people that will move, and draw projections for the 
 
within the frames of FP6 (Priority 8.1 – Policy-oriented research) of the 
European Commission.”). See generally INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MIGRATION, 
ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE (Frank Laczko & 
Christine Aghazarm eds., 2009); Rafael Reuveny, Ecomigration and Violent 
Conflict: Case Studies and Public Policy Implications, 36 HUM. ECOLOGY 1 
(2007). 
 19. Graeme Hugo, Environmental Concerns and International Migration, 30 
INT’L MIGRATION REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 105, 110–13 (1996). 
 20. See GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., MIGRATION AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHANGE: FUTURE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 44–54 (2011), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/28
7717/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmental-change.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HQ9U-4LCR]; Jane McAdam, Swimming Against the Tide: 
Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer, 23 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 1, 10 (2011) [hereinafter Swimming Against the Tide]; Barnett & 
Webber, supra note 13, at 5–6. 
 21. Benoit Mayer, The International Legal Challenges of Climate Induced 
Migration: Proposal for an International Legal Framework, 22 COLO. J. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 357, 366 (2011). 
 22. PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, at 12–13. 
 23. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 7. 
 24. PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, at 12. 
7
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future. Though, the empirical evidence remains scarce,25 there 
are, however, significant efforts to explore the extent of the issue. 
26  These studies confirm the reality of the issue, though also 
acknowledging its complexity the mixed character of push 
factors.27  Furthermore, in its Fifth Assessment Report the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is in the 
high agreement that climate change will increase the 
displacement of people over the course of the 21st Century.28  A 
deeper understanding of the issue and further empirical research 
are nevertheless required. 
B.  Absence of Single Pattern 
Second, population mobility in response to climate change 
can take different patterns. Migration varies depending on the 
length of time and distance. For example, migration can be 
temporary or permanent; it can also be internal or cross borders. 
Most researchers currently agree that most of the climate 
induced population movement will predominantly be temporary 
and will happen internally.29  These types of mobility will occur 
mostly in reaction to sudden-onset disasters and rapid-onset 
phenomena (such as cyclones, typhoons and floods).30  Slow-onset 
 
 25. Stephen Castles, Afterword: What Now? Climate-Induced Displacement 
after Copenhagen, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 239, 243. 
 26. See generally KOKO WARNER ET AL., WHERE THE RAIN FALLS: CLIMATE 
CHANGE, FOOD AND LIVELIHOOD SECURITY, AND MIGRATION (2012), 
http://www.axa.com/lib/axa/uploads/wheretherainfalls/Wtrf_ExecutiveSummary.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ULZ4-K35Y]; WORLD BANK, CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
MIGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (Quentin 
Wodon et al. eds., 2014); CCEMA, supra note 18. 
 27. See generally WARNER ET AL., supra note 26; WORLD BANK, supra note 26; 
CCEMA, supra note 18. 
 28. IPCC 2014, supra note 2, at 20. 
 29. Jane McAdam, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Climate Change 
Displacement and International Law: Complementary Protection Standards, 
U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/03, at 8–10 (2010); Swimming Against the Tide, supra 
note 20, at 8, 11–12; Sheila C. McAnaney, Sinking Islands? Formulating a 
Realistic Solution to Climate Change Displacement, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1172, 
1178–79 (2012) [hereinafter Sinking Islands]. 
 30. Walter Kälin, Conceptualizing Climate-Induced Displacement, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 14, at 81, 82; PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, at 15. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/1
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impacts of climate change will also induce population movement, 
which is expected to be gradual and essentially also internal.31 
There will, however, be cross-border movements, some of 
which will be permanent in nature (such as in cases of slow-onset 
environmental degradation or, in cases of small island states, 
where there is a risk of submergence of the entire territory).32 
Since there is no clear pattern of climate-related migration, 
and with many different types of movement possible, the 
conceptualization is hampered by the fact that each scenario will 
require a separate approach with specific concerns to be 
addressed.33 
C.  Absence of Single Form 
Third, mobility can also take various forms, such as 
voluntary migration, induced displacement, or 
resettlement/planned relocation.34  As Piguet et al. remarks: “It is 
indeed extremely difficult to capture the decision-making process 
among potential migrants and to understand why, how and when 
people decide to leave.”35  The distinction between forced and 
voluntary, therefore, often stays blurred.36  This presents further 
obstacles in conceptualization and legal protection since, as 
Warner emphasizes, “[t]he needs of affected people vary across 
different types of human mobility: migration, displacement and 
planned relocation.”37 
 
 31. Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 20, at 8 ; Sinking Islands, supra 
note 29, at 1179. 
 32. Kälin, supra note 30, at 85. 
 33. See id. at 85–86. Kälin distinguished five different scenarios of climate-
induced migration, addressing displacement following: sudden-onset disasters, 
slow-onset environmental degradation, the disappearance of the state (small 
island states), displacement from the areas acknowledged as “high-risk zones 
too dangerous for human habitation,” and “unrest seriously disturbing public 
order, violence or even armed conflict.” Id. 
 34. Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 14. 
 35. PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, at 15. 
 36. Id. 
 37. KOKO WARNER ET AL., CHANGING CLIMATE, MOVING PEOPLE: FRAMING 
MIGRATION, DISPLACEMENT AND PLANNED RELOCATION 8 (2013). 
9
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D.  Regional Aspect 
Fourth, conceptualization of the issue is hampered by the fact 
that climate-induced population movement has a strong regional 
character.38 
The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report identified that risks 
associated with climate change are “regionally differentiated” and 
“unevenly distributed.”39  The specific context of the region often 
impacts the length of movement and specific obstacles faced by 
those who have to relocate. For instance, while migration from 
small island states will not involve big numbers of people, it 
might, however, be cross-border, with no opportunity for 
islanders to return. In Africa, migration is mainly happening 
within the continent but is hampered by the number of people 
affected, conflicts, and political clashes.40  Governments in 
different countries can also have different approaches in 
managing mobility, with some stimulating it and some deterring 
it.41  Furthermore, data about the nature and extent of 
population movements from some regions is less available than 
from others.42 
Although, as some academics argue, this regional context 
creates a great potential for addressing the issue,43 it also 
impedes the process of conceptualization. 
 
 38. See generally PEOPLE ON THE MOVE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: THE REGIONAL 
IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ON MIGRATION (Etienne Piguet & Frank 
Laczko eds., 2014). 
 39. IPCC 2014, supra note 2, at 12. 
 40. Nancy C. Tolentino & João Peixoto, Migration, Remittances and 
Development in Africa: The Case of Lusophone Countries, ACP OBSERVATORY ON 
MIGRATION 5, ACP Doc. ACPOBS/2011/BN03 (2011), https://publications.iom.int/ 
books/migration-remittances-and-development-africa-case-lusophone-countries 
[https://perma.cc/M6F8-7ND9]. 
 41. Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 20, at 18. 
 42. Such a lack of data, for instance, is identified in regard to Asia and 
Pacific. See ASIA DEV. BANK, POLICY OPTIONS TO SUPPORT CLIMATE-INDUCED 
MIGRATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, at ix, 4 (2012), http://www.adb.org/sites/ 
default/files/publication/29662/addressing-climate-change-migration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RFE5-XRGE?type=source]. 
 43. Swimming Against the Tide, supra note 20, at 25–26 (arguing that 
dealing with the problem on the regional level by promoting migration through 
regional and bilateral agreements is beneficial); Angela Williams, Turning the 
Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law, 30 L. & POL’Y,  
502, 518 (2008) (same). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/1
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E.  Legal Gaps 
The four conceptual complications listed above make it 
extremely hard to create a definition, estimate the numbers of 
people moving, and draw prognoses for the future. This in turn 
poses difficulties in finding a legal approach, giving legal status 
to people moving due to climate change, and establishing 
protection mechanisms. Below the limitations of the relevant 
legal frameworks and the few opportunities they offer are 
analyzed. 
1. Refugee Law 
Although the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”) is the most relevant 
legal framework at the international level for the protection of 
populations displaced across borders, it is also commonly agreed 
that it is unfit for the problem of climate-induced population 
movement.44  The definition of “refugee” in the Refugee 
Convention includes three main elements: the person is outside of 
the country of origin, due to persecution based on a closed 
number of grounds, and the person is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of their country.45  People migrating due 
to climate change and environmental issues do not fall within 
this definition. Besides the requirement of exile, which will not be 
fulfilled by those who move internally, climate change cannot be 
categorised as persecution, since persecution is commonly 
connected to the actions of government.46  Furthermore, the 
Refugee Convention limits the grounds for persecution to race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion, and does not leave much room for 
 
 44. GROMILOVA & JÄGERS, supra note 1, at 80–89; Kälin & Schrepfer, supra 
note 8, at 31–34; JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 44-48 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012); see also Brown, supra 
note 4, at 13–15. 
 45. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, ¶ 2, July 28, 1951, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
 46. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3, at 13 (Dec. 
2011) (“Persecution is normally related to actions by the authorities of a 
country.”). 
11
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interpretation.47  Meanwhile, the nature of climate change 
impacts is, to a large extent, indiscriminative and is not tied to 
particular characteristics such as a person’s background or 
beliefs.48 
As Kälin and Schrepfer demonstrate, there are, however, a 
few situations where people displaced by climate change could fit 
under the refugee definition. Among these are the “situations of 
violence, serious human rights violations or armed conflict 
triggered by disputes over shrinking natural resources . . . if 
persecutory measures are based on the race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion of 
affected persons.”49  Other cases could be when a government 
denies certain groups of people assistance or protection against 
climate change, or when the climate change-related policy of a 
government has a discriminative impact on specific groups of 
people.50  In such cases, it might be possible to establish a cause-
effect relationship between the impacts of climate change on 
people and governmental actions. Nevertheless, this kind of 
correlation will not be found in the majority of cases of climate-
induced population movement. 
It is important to note that several regional instruments 
contain a broader definition of a refugee. Among notable 
examples are the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 
(“OAU Convention”),51 the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on 
 
 47. Williams, supra note 43, at 508. 
 48. GROMILOVA & JÄGERS, supra note 1, at 85. 
 49. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 33; see also JON BARNETT & NEIL 
ADGER, SECURITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: TOWARDS AN IMPROVED UNDERSTANDING 
5-8 (2005) (discussing the impact of relative poverty on the potential for armed 
conflict); DAN SMITH & JANANI VIVEKANANDA, INT’L ALERT, A CLIMATE OF 
CONFLICT: THE LINKS BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE, PEACE AND WAR 9–22 (2007) 
(discussing the potential for armed conflicts due to climate change). 
 50. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 32–33; Jane McAdam, From 
Economic Refugees to Climate Refugees?, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 579, 591–93 
(2009) [hereinafter From Economic Refugees]. 
 51. Organization of African Unity [OAU] Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. 1, ¶ 2, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 
45 (including any person compelled to leave his/her country because of “external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public 
order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality”). 
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Refugees of Latin America (“Cartagena Declaration”),52 and the 
1994 Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in Arab 
Countries (“Arab Convention”).53  Furthermore, people induced to 
movement by climate change can arguably find protection under 
EU legislation. The EU Temporary Protection Directive provides 
temporary protection in the situation of “mass-influxes” of 
“persons at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, 
systematic” or “endemic violence.”54  The EU Qualification 
Directive allows for subsidiary protection of applicants who do not 
qualify for Convention refugee protection and therefore may 
receive subsidiary protection if it is considered that the applicant 
faces “a real risk of suffering serious harm.”55 
However, none of the regional instruments (the OAU 
Convention, the Cartagena Declaration, the Arab Convention) are 
understood to cover climate migrants nor are they supported by 
opinio juris.56  When it comes to the EU, the Temporary 
 
 52. Org, of Am. States, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, art. 3,  ¶ 3 (Nov. 
22, 1984) (extending the definition of refugee to persons who have fled their 
country “because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by 
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of 
human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
order”). 
 53. League of Arab States, Arab Convention on Regulating Status of 
Refugees in the Arab Countries, art. 1 (1994) (defining a refugee as “[a]ny 
person who unwillingly takes refuge in a country other than his country of 
origin or his habitual place of residence because of the sustained aggression 
against, occupation and foreign domination of such country or because of the 
occurrence of natural disasters or grave events resulting in major disruption of 
public order in the whole country or any part thereof”). 
 54. Council Directive 2001/55, art. 2(c), 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12, 14 (EC) 
[hereinafter Temporary Protection Directive] (describing minimum standards for 
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons 
and measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in 
receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof). 
 55. Council Directive 2004/83, art. 2(e), 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 14 (EC) 
[hereinafter Qualification Directive] (describing minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as 
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted); Vikram Kolmannskog & Finn Myrstad, 
Environmental Displacement in European Asylum Law, 11 EUR. J. MIGRATION & 
L. 313, 319 (2009). 
 56. As regard to the Arab Convention, no States have ratified the Arab 
Convention and therefore it has no legal force. The application of the definition 
of the OAU Convention is not supported by the opinio juris of African states. 
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Protection Directive offers some temporary opportunities for 
people forcibly displaced by climate change in cases when a 
qualified majority of the Council will qualify the flight of 
displaced people as a “mass influx.”57  The Temporary Protection 
Directive is not a solution for individuals in need of protection nor 
for those who need to stay longer or permanently.58  The 
subsidiary protection under Article 15 of the Qualification 
Directive for people displaced by climate change is questionable. 
It is highly challenging to show that these people are at “a real 
risk of suffering serious harm” in the sense of “serious harm” as 
defined in the Directive.59  The protection will, therefore, mainly 
lean on the principle of non-refoulement,60 which is addressed 
further. 
Interestingly, whereas international and regional refugee law 
can be considered as failing in providing protection to people 
induced to move by climate change, national laws in certain 
countries have been more successful in dealing with the problem. 
Currently, two states, Finland and Sweden, have adopted asylum 
laws granting subsidiary protection for “environmental 
migrants.”61  These regulations are an exception to the rule and 
have not been in frequent use. Nevertheless, the Scandinavian 
example shows that individual states have the potential to issue 
immigration and asylum policy to provide legal protection for 
environmental migrants.62 
 
The Cartagena Declaration in practice has not been understood as covering 
natural disasters. See McAdam, supra note 29, at 14–15. 
 57. Kolmannskog & Myrstad, supra note 55, at 317. 
 58. Id. at 318. 
 59. Id. at 319. 
 60. Id. at 323. The non-refoulement principle is delt with in the following 
section. 
 61. 4 ch. 2–2a §§ Aliens Act (SFS 2005:716) (Swed.) (extending to anyone who 
has left his or her native country and does not wish to return there because he 
or she: (1) has a fear of the death penalty or torture is in need of protection as a 
result of war or other serious conflicts in the country, and (2) is unable to return 
to the native country because of an environmental disaster); 6 ch. 88a § Aliens 
Act (SFS: 1152/2010) (Fin.) (providing an “alien residing in Finland is issued 
with a residence permit on the basis humanitarian protection” if they cannot 
return because of an armed conflict or environmental disaster). 
 62. See generally Benjamin Glahn, “Climate Refugees”? Addressing the 
International Legal Gaps, INT’L B. ASS’N (2009), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/ 
Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=B51C02C1-3C27-4AE3-B4C4-7E350EB0F442 
[http://perma.cc/V7Y3-Z4H8]. 
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Even though regional or national instruments could give 
opportunities, approaching the issue of climate-induced 
displacement through the refugee regime does not cover those 
who will be displaced within the state and does not allow for a 
proactive approach, meaning that protection only applies after 
the displacement takes place. Furthermore, it only covers cases of 
sudden-onset events and does not allow for the protection of 
people affected by slow-onset environmental degradation. 
It is also crucial to note that fitting people displaced by 
climate change into the refugee regime distorts the principally 
different nature of the issue. The case of people affected by 
climate change involves different types of moral and legal 
responsibility. As McAdam puts it: 
Whereas refugees within the Refugee Convention definition flee 
their own government (or actors that the government is unable or 
unwilling to protect them from), a person fleeing the effects of 
climate change is not escaping his or her government, but rather 
is seeking a refuge from—yet within—states that have 
contributed to climate change.63 
People displaced by climate change are willing to have the 
protection of their country and in many cases do not want to 
leave.64 
2. Human Rights Law 
Taking the number of human rights that are threatened 
during climate-induced population movements, the relevance of 
human rights law is beyond doubt.65 
In 2008, the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 
7/23, which was the first U.N. Resolution to recognize “that 
climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to 
people and communities around the world and has significant 
implications for the full enjoyment of human rights.”66  In 2009, 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) and the International Council on Human Rights 
 
 63. From Economic Refugees, supra note 50, at 592. 
 64. Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 85. 
 65. Id. at 81–87. 
 66. Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/78 (Mar. 28, 2008). 
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Policy (ICHRP) adopted Resolution 10/4, which addressed the 
relationship between human rights and climate change in 
international law was.67  This resolution noted “climate change-
related impacts have a range of implications, both direct and 
indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights.”68 
 
The list of human rights that can be implicated during 
climate-induced movement is extensive and includes, among 
others, the right to life, the right to adequate food, the right to 
water, the right to health, the right to adequate housing, the 
right to take part in cultural life, the right to self-determination, 
and the right to development.69 
The advantage of human rights law when it comes to the 
issue of climate-induced movement is that it applies to all people 
regardless of whether one is displaced or not. Therefore, the issue 
of causality, which is one of the central conceptual challenges, is 
avoided.70  However, there are further obstacles. These obstacles 
vary depending on the type and the character of movement. 
a. Displacement within the State 
It is the duty of states to respect, protect, and fulfil all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms regardless of their political, 
economic, and cultural systems. Under human rights law, states 
have the primary legal obligation towards those within its 
territory and jurisdiction.71  The normative framework for those 
displaced within a state is therefore better developed than for 
those who have crossed borders due to climate change. First of 
all, there are hard-law instruments, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
 
 67. Human Rights Council Res. 10/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (Mar. 20, 2009). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 81–87. This list of 
implicated human rights is not exhaustive since the nature of human rights is 
such that all of them are interdependent, interrelated and indivisible. 
 70. GROMILOVA & JÄGERS, supra note 1, at 88. 
 71. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, Dec. 19, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 14668 [hereinafter ICCPR]; John H. Knox, Climate Change 
and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 196 (2009); see also International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 14531 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), which fixate the obligations of states towards 
individuals within its territory or under its jurisdiction.72  
Second, the soft-law protection applies. People who are forcibly 
displaced internally fall under the remit of the 1998 Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement.73  The movement has to be of 
a forced character, which covers the situations of sudden-onset 
environmental impacts. The Guiding Principles is a soft-law 
instrument that has no binding power on governments. Third, it 
has to be taken into account that most of the states affected by 
climate change and within which the displacement of people will 
take place are developing or least-developed countries—
financially weak and with a poor capacity to ensure human rights 
of their populations.74  Furthermore, this instrument does not 
apply to those who move due to slow-onset environmental 
degradation in a pre-emptive manner. 
Concerning those who are displaced within the state due to 
the slow-onset environmental degradation, states have the 
obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil the human rights of all 
people within their jurisdiction.75  However, the point made above 
 
 72. ICCPR, supra note 71, art. 2; Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: SIX DECADES AFTER THE 
UDHR AND BEYOND 49, 71–73 (Mashood Baderin & Manisuli Ssenyonjo eds., 
2010). 
 73. See Francis M. Deng (Rep. of the U.N. Secretary-General), Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 
1998). At the regional level there is also the 2009 Kampala Convention. African 
Union, Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced 
Persons in Africa (Oct. 23, 2009). This instrument is legally binding for state 
parties and covers those displaced by natural disaster. Importantly, the 
Kampala Convention lays down the responsibility of governments that have 
failed to act according to their human rights obligations in preventing disasters 
or impacts where such harm is foreseeable. See id. Already twenty-two countries 
have ratified the Convention. The Kampala Convention, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 
MONITORING CENTRE, http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/ 
kampala-convention/ [http://perma.cc/J3JT-SFFJ]. This instrument, however, 
remains outside the scope of this article, since it does not cover the movement in 
response to the slow-onset environmental degradation and pre-emptive 
movement. 
 74. STEPHEN HUMPHREYS, Climate Change and International Human Rights 
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE 29, 38 (Edward 
Elgar ed., 2012). 
 75. Eur. Court of Human Rights, European Convention on Human Rights, 
art. 1 (2013); Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of 
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is equally relevant here. These are usually developing countries 
where access to justice often proves problematic.76 
b. Crossing the Border 
If a person flees across a national border due to 
environmental factors, this person will be entitled to general 
human rights guarantees in a receiving state in line with the 
human rights obligations of that state.77 Since people induced to 
move by climate change probably will search for a job and, 
therefore, can be considered as “engage[d] in remunerated 
activity,”78 the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families is a 
relevant instrument. However, first of all, this Convention does 
not provide for any rights to be admitted to a foreign territory and 
to remain there.79  Secondly, the search for a job in most cases 
will probably not be the first need for displaced people, since 
finding a place to stay and ensuring that they have access to food 
and water will likely be higher priorities.80 
While most of the people displaced by climate change will not 
have a right to be admitted into and to remain on the territory of 
other state, they can find protection against being removed. This 
can be possible under complementary protection that follows from 
the principle of non-refoulement, which has been enshrined in 
several human rights provisions such as the prohibition of torture 
and other inhuman or degrading treatment.81  According to the 
principle of non-refoulement, asylum seekers already present 
within a jurisdiction cannot be removed by that state to a country 
where the person will face a real risk of persecution or exposure 
to torture, inhuman treatment, or other serious human rights 
 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶¶ 3, 
10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004) [hereinafter General Comment 
No. 31]; ICCPR, supra note 71, art. 2. 
 76. GROMILOVA & JÄGERS, supra note 1, at  93–94. 
 77. ICCPR, supra note 71, art. 2(1). 
 78. G.A. Res. 45/158, art. 49, ¶ 1 (Dec. 18, 1990), http://www.un.org/ 
documents/ga/res/45/a45r158.htm [https://perma.cc/FG9Y-PKRM]. 
 79. See General Comment No. 31, supra note 75. 
 80. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 35. 
 81. GROMILOVA & JÄGERS, supra note 1, at 96–97. 
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violations.82  As Kälin and Schrepfer observe, “the doctrinal basis 
of this jurisprudence is the idea that in all such cases it is not the 
behavior of the state of destination that is being adjudicated but 
that of the state whose authorities order the expulsion or 
deportation.”83  However, a case has been decided in which it was 
acknowledged that deportation would be an inhuman act based 
on actions of the destination country. In  D v United Kingdom, it 
was ruled that the removal of an HIV-infected person back to St. 
Kitts would reduce “already limited life expectancy and subject 
[the person] to acute mental and physical suffering.”84  Arguably, 
people forcibly displaced by climate change may also be exposed 
to the “life threatening situation” if they are sent back.85 
However, it is doubtful that complementary protection 
following the principle of non-refoulement can offer meaningful 
protection to people displaced by climate change. As has been 
emphasized in D v United Kingdom, the circumstances of the case 
are “very exceptional” and, as Kolmannskog and Myrstad point 
out, the subsequent case-law has interpreted the possibilities 
offered by the case quite restrictively.86  Moreover, the 
prohibition of sending people back is not giving people any rights 
to be admitted. This means that people will expose themselves to 
numerous live-threatening situations in attempts to cross 
borders.87 
c. Extraterritorial Obligations 
It has been discussed that in both cases (when relocation 
happens within the state or when it takes place across state 
borders) it is problematic to ensure that displaced people will be 
sufficiently protected. This is, however, mainly connected to the 
 
 82. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Note on the Principle of Non-
Refoulement (Nov. 1997), http://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html 
[http://perma.cc/6TAH-L9MH]. 
 83. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 35. 
 84. D v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 423, ¶ 52 (1997). 
 85. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 36; see MARGIT AMMER, CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE STATUS OF CLIMATE REFUGEES IN EUROPE 58–59 
(2009), http://www.migration-online.de/data/climatechangepaper0609.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/NH55-RSB8]. 
 86. Kolmannskog & Myrstad, supra note 55, at 322. 
 87. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1. 
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fact that the regions where most of the people are and will be 
displaced are poor and generally fail to provide human rights 
protection to even their own citizens. 
However, human rights law primarily addresses the 
obligations of other states when states fail to protect human 
rights of people within their territory. The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
does not have a restricting jurisdictional clause. Article 2(1), 
provides: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant . 
. . .88 
Consequently, economic, social, and cultural rights are 
generally considered to have an extraterritorial component.89  
The obligation of states to protect, respect, and fulfil these rights 
is not restricted to a given state’s jurisdiction.90 
Moreover, the essential role of cooperation and assistance in 
facilitating the full realization of the relevant rights is further 
underlined by the specific provisions contained in articles 11, 15, 
22, and 23 of the ICESCR.91  The ICESCR is particularly relevant 
for those who are displaced due to climate change as this will 
frequently imply a violation of economic, social and cultural 
rights, such as the right to housing, an adequate standard of 
living, or the right to health. According to Sepúlveda, the premise 
of Article 2(1) is that “some countries are not able to achieve the 
full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights if those 
countries in the position to assist do not actually provide them 
 
 88. ICESCR, supra note 71, art. 2(1). 
 89. GROMILOVA & JÄGERS, supra note 1, at 95. 
 90. Rescuing Tuvaluans, supra note 1, at 260–63. Furthermore, “State 
Parties to the ICESCR in a position to assist are also obliged to provide this 
assistance to those who are not parties to the Covenant.” Id. at 280. 
 91. ICESCR, supra note 71, art. 11, 15, 22, 23. 
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with assistance.”92  This understanding of extraterritorial 
character regarding the realization of economic, social, and 
cultural rights finds further support in the General Comments 
and other human rights reports and soft-law instruments.93  The 
Maastricht principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in 
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is one of the 
prominent developments in that regard.94  Moreover, when it 
comes to climate change, the committee supervising the ICESCR 
has held that this obligation entails, inter alia, the obligation to 
“take steps through international cooperation and assistance, 
depending on the availability of resources, to facilitate the 
fulfilment of human rights in other countries, including disaster 
relief, emergency assistance, and assistance to refugees and 
displaced persons.”95 
The extraterritorial obligations within the context of climate-
induced population movement play a vital role. As demonstrated, 
regions where most of climate-induced population movement 
takes and will take place lack the capacity to protect and fulfil the 
human rights of people within its territory. In many cases, 
neighbouring states also lack this capacity. Therefore, the 
assistance from those states that are in the position to assist can 
significantly diminish the human rights risks associated with 
migration, induced displacement and planned relocation. 
 
 92. Magdalena Sepúlveda, Obligations of ‘International Assistance and 
Cooperation’ in an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, 24 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 271, 290 (2006). 
 93. See id. at 290–92. 
 94. See generally ETO CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT PRINCIPLES ON 
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS (2013), http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/ 
library/maastricht-principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23 
[http://perma.cc/TTW9-66UE]. 
 95. GROMILOVA & JÄGERS, supra note 1, at 95; see also U.N. Comm. Econ., 
Soc. & Cult. Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 
11), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999); U.N. Comm. Econ., Soc. & Cult. 
Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education (Art. 13), U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8, 1999); U.N. Comm. Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rights, General 
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 
12), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000); U.N. Comm. Econ., Soc. & Cult. 
Rights, General Comment No.15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the 
Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C/12/2002/11 (Sept. 25, 2015). 
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While the legal basis of the extraterritorial obligations might 
be acknowledged,96 the character, scope, and the extent of these 
obligations are questionable.97  First, regardless of the fact that 
the Committee has referred to states’ obligations of international 
assistance and cooperation in various observations, comments, 
and practices, there is still a great level of disagreement as to 
whether the obligations underpinning the provision of Article 2 
are legally binding.98  There is no legally binding document that 
elaborates on the content of extraterritorial obligations. Second, 
the reach of extraterritorial obligations is a key issue.99  Neither 
the form of assistance nor its reach is identified. As Knox argues, 
the obligation of international assistance is an extension of the 
duty to fulfil, which is an open-ended obligation that imposes 
positive, rather than negative, duties on states.100  Furthermore, 
human rights law to a large extent remains attached to 
jurisdiction.101  Although the ICESCR suggests that the 
obligations extend beyond states, this understanding requires 
further support. 
Yet, human rights law is an important framework when it 
comes to the issue of climate-induced population movement. The 
main advantage is that it applies to everyone regardless of 
whether the causation between climate change and population 
 
 96. Christian Courtis & Magdalena Sepúlveda, Are Extra-Territorial 
Obligations Reviewable Under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR?, 27 
NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MENNESKERETTIGHETER 54, 55–56, 
http://www.henderson.uottawa.ca/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_down
load/gid,83/lang,fr/ (2009) [http://perma.cc/8DL2-MTKD]; Knox, supra note 71, 
at 201–02. 
 97. Knox, supra note 71, at 207; Dominic McGoldrick, Extraterritorial 
Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, IN 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 41, 47–49 (FONS 
COOMANS & MENNO T. KAMMINGA EDS., 2004); see MALCOLM LANGFORD ET AL., 
GLOBAL JUSTICE, STATE DUTIES: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL SCOPE OF ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014). 
 98. LANGFORD ET AL., supra note 96, at 62–63. In the debates surrounding the 
drafting of the optional protocol to the ICESCR, countries such as the UK, 
Canada, France, and others claimed that international cooperation and 
assistance is an “important moral obligation but not a legal entitlement.”. Id. at 
62 (internal quotations omitted). 
 99. Id. at 64. 
 100. Rescuing Tuvaluans, supra note 1, at 283–84; Knox, supra note 71, at 
208. 
 101. HUMPHREYS, supra note 74, at 56. 
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movement is established. It also lays down legal obligations of 
international assistance and cooperation, which is of a particular 
importance for people affected by climate change. 
d. Human Rights-Based Approach to Climate 
Change 
There is another important development within the human 
rights policy field that has great added value for the issue of 
climate-induced population movement. This development is the 
emergence of the human rights-based approach. The human 
rights-based approach has often been mentioned in relation to 
climate change in climate-change negotiations and discussions.102  
In a nutshell, von Doussa defined it as follows: “[A] human rights-
based approach provides a conceptual framework for climate 
change policies; a framework which is normatively based on 
international human rights standards and which is practically 
directed to promoting and protecting human rights.”103  The 
importance of the human rights-based approach to adaptation 
has been emphasised by the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has called for increased state 
action on adaptation and has emphasized the importance of 
applying a human rights-based approach in guiding policies and 
measures related to climate change mitigation and adaptation.104  
According to the OHCHR, a human rights-based approach should 
be integrated into any climate change adaptation or mitigation 
policy.105 
The added value of the human rights-based approach for 
each type of adaptation strategy suggested in the Cancun 
 
 102. HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2008), http://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/ 
content/pdf/about/media/papers/hrandclimate_change.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/P7XK-EC9T]; see HUMPHREYS, supra note 74, at 56; Marc 
Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political 
Action, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 440–48 (2009); Human Rights Council, 
REP. OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 
A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Climate Change & Human Rights 
Report]. 
 103. HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 102, at 12. 
 104. See Climate Change & Human Rights Report, supra note 102, ¶¶ 92–99. 
 105. See id. 
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Agreement (migration, displacement, and planned relocation) is 
that it allows for a focus on individuals and sensitivity towards 
their problems. It allows for complementing the technical side of 
adaptation strategies, and making adaptation to climate change 
sensitive to human rights during each technical stage—
preparation, implementation, and evaluation of adaptation 
strategies.106 
3. Climate Law 
Since it is climate change that induces people to move, 
climate law is of central importance. The UNFCCC and its 
supporting instruments form a basis for a dynamic and rapidly 
evolving climate law regime.107 
a. Obligations Arising from Principles of the 
UNFCCC 
i.  No-Harm Rule 
The preamble to the UNFCCC and Article 3 set out a number 
of international environmental principles applicable to the 
regime. Among these is the “no-harm” principle, which has also 
gained the status of international customary law.108  The 
preamble recalls the words of Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration and Principle 2 of its successor, the 1992 Rio 
Declaration, and notes that states have: 
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental and developmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
 
 106. See Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 92–94. 
 107. Kati Kulovesi, Exploring the Landscape of Climate Law and Scholarship: 
Two Emerging Trends, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 31, 35 (Erkki J. Hollo 
et al. eds., 2012). 
 108. United States v. Canada, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941); PHILIPPE SANDS & 
JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 196 (3d 
ed. 2012). Another principle of international customary law, which might be 
relevant is the “polluter pays principle.” This principle provides that the 
“polluter should, in principle, bear the costs of pollution.” SANDS & PEEL, supra, 
at 229. Nevertheless, the “polluter pays principle” has not received a lot of 
support and attention among States and in case law. Id. 
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control do not cause damage to the environment of other States 
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.109 
This principle allows for a claim that some states have 
caused damage to other states because of their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, which have resulted in the migration of people 
and, therefore, these states should also be responsible for helping 
these people. When a rule of customary international law, such as 
the “no-harm rule,” is breached, states can be held responsible for 
the damages. 110  However, to establish the breach of this rule in 
reality is highly challenging due to the hurdle of establishing 
causality between the damaging activity and the damage to the 
third state.111  The state where climate-induced movement takes 
place would therefore have to prove, first, that the emissions of 
some particular state have caused the specific climate change 
impact (for instance, sea-level rise) and, second, that this 
particular sea-level rise has led to the migration of people.112  To 
establish this kind of causality under contemporary international 
law appears highly challenging, if not impossible.113 
 
 109. UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164, 166; U.N. Conference on the 
Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/48/14/Rev.1 
(June 16, 1972); U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/151/26/Rev.1 
(June 14, 1992). 
 110. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 31, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1. “Every 
internationally wrongful act of the State entails the responsibility of that State.” 
Id. To establish this responsibility, the following elements must be met: (a) a 
wrongful act attributable to the state, (b) a causal link between the activity and 
damage, and (c) a violation of either international law or a violation of a duty of 
care, which is (d) owed to the damaged State. See id. 
 111. STEPHEN GARDINER ET AL., CLIMATE ETHICS: ESSENTIAL READINGS 84 
(2010); see Richard Tol & Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and 
Compensation for Climate Change Damages—A Legal and Economical 
Assessment, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 1109, 1110–14 (2004). 
 112. Rebecca E. Jacobs, Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in 
Tuvalu's Threat to Sue the United States in the International Court Of Justice, 
14 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J 103, 111 (2005); see Rescuing Tuvaluans, supra note 1, 
at 247–49, for other problems in establishing causation. 
 113. See Tol & Verheyen, supra note 110, at 1112; see also Christina Voigt, 
State Responsibility for Climate Change Damage, 77 NORDIC J. INT‘L L. 1, 21 
(2008). 
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ii.  Precautionary principle 
Another highly relevant principle is the precautionary 
principle, included in Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC. This principle 
requires parties to: 
take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize 
the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and 
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so 
as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.114 
The principle requires proactive measures, which, in the case 
of climate-induced population movement, means that there is no 
need to wait for harm and establish causation. Even when it is 
not possible to wholly attribute the cause of population 
displacement to climate change, in the face of a lack of scientific 
evidence on the impact of climate change and the link to 
migration, it is necessary to take a precautionary approach. As 
Hugo observes, even though discussions on the extent of climate-
induced displacement often tend to exaggerate the scope of the 
issue,115 it is nevertheless a fact that displacement is inevitable. 
In these cases, as Hugo argues, the precautionary principle must 
apply.116 
This principle has been increasingly applied in courts, 
especially in environmental cases.117  As Sands and Peel argue, 
there is a sufficient support for an argument that the 
precautionary principle reflects a principle of customary law.118 
 
 114. UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 170. 
 115. GRAEME HUGO, Lessons from Past Forced Resettlement for Climate 
Change Migration, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 260, 267 (2011). 
 116. See id. 
 117. See, e.g., SANDS & PEEL, supra note 108, at 223–28. In particular, the 
Hague District Court has ruled that “[t]he fact that the amount of the Dutch 
emissions is small compared to other countries does not affect the obligation to 
take precautionary measures in view of the State’s obligation to exercise care.” 
Rb.-Hague 24 June 2015, RvdW 2015, 7196 M.NT. (URGENDA FOUNDATION/THE 
STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS) (NETH.), http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/ 
inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 [http://perma.cc/W85N-G99C]. 
 118. SANDS & PEEL, supra note 108, at 228. 
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For the issue of climate-induced population movement, the 
precautionary approach has paramount importance, since it can 
encourage pro-active resettlement of communities in cases where 
relocation is the only option, can mobilize adaptation efforts at an 
early stage, and can also foster the provision of assistance in 
adaptation. 
iii.  Principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities 
Last, but not least, the UNFCCC lays down the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities, which is the central 
pillar of the climate law regime. Article 3(1) of the UNFCCC 
states: 
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of 
equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.119 
In the context of climate change-induced population 
movement, this principle means that those countries that have 
contributed the most to climate change should take a lead in 
assisting countries where climate change impacts cause 
population movement to respond and to manage this movement. 
b. Treaty-based obligations 
Positive obligations under the climate law regime follow the 
UNFCCC and its supporting instruments.120  The obligations are 
differentiated among parties, in line with the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities.121 
 
 119. UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 169. 
 120. See generally Kulovesi, supra note 107. 
 121. UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 170 (“All Parties, taking into 
account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific 
national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, 
shall . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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Besides the positive obligations of states regarding 
mitigation, the UNFCCC lays down adaptation obligations, which 
are relevant in the case of climate-induced population movement. 
More specifically, Article 4(1)(b) requires states to 
“[f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national 
and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing . . . 
measures to facilitate adaptation to climate change.”122 
Obligations regarding adaptation are also differentiated 
among parties.  Developing states must be assisted by developed 
states, and their success in adaptation depends on the extent to 
which this assistance is available to them.123  In particular, 
Article 4(3) sets financial obligations aimed at helping developing 
countries meet the agreed full costs of preparing for adaptation 
and also to provide such financial resources, including for the 
transfer of technology needed by the developing country Parties 
to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing 
measures.124  Article 4(4) goes further and provides that the 
developed country Parties and other developed Parties included 
in Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change in meeting costs of adaptation.125  This broad obligation, 
as some scholars argue, sets unlimited liability on the part of 
developed countries for the costs of adaptation.126 
Article 4, in general and specifically its subsections 4(3) and 
4(4), is the most prominent reflection of the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and clearly establishes the 
obligations of developed states. Further, it can be argued that 
these obligations can be translated into the context of climate 
change and population movement. 
The most crucial development regarding climate change and 
population movement that has taken place within climate law is 
that migration, induced displacement, and planned relocation 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 174. 
 124. Id. at 173. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See M.J. Mace, Adaptation under the U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change: The International Legal Framework, in FAIRNESS IN 
ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 53, 64 (W. Neil Adger et al. eds., 2006). 
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have been acknowledged as adaptation strategies.127  The Cancun 
Agreement has invited the Parties to enhance understanding and 
cooperation with regard to migration, induced displacement, and 
planned relocation as adaptation strategies.128  It has also 
encouraged least-developed countries to develop National 
Adaptation Plans (NAPs).129  These plans can specify measures 
that can “facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change”130 
through, for instance, strategies for the planned relocation of 
people. Although the Cancun Adaptation Framework is a 
voluntary agreement that does not have binding power over its 
parties,131 it allows for specifying the form of assistance 
suggested by Article 4 of the UNFCCC. 
Ensuring compliance with the provisions of Article 4 of the 
UNFCCC and paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Agreement is 
problematic in reality.132  First of all, under Article 4(3), 
developed countries are expected to provide funding to developing 
countries to meet the “agreed full costs” and “agreed full 
incremental costs” of adaptation.133  This means the costs agreed 
upon between developing countries and the UNFCCC’s financial 
mechanism, which is represented by the Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF).134  Reaching agreement on projects that involve 
the relocation of people will, in reality, become problematic, since, 
besides the issue of financing, sensitive political issues (such as 
who will accommodate migrants) will have to be resolved. Second, 
developing countries are only eligible to receive finances that 
cover “incremental costs.”135  The UNFCCC does not specify what 
 
 127. Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 14. 
 128. Id. 
 129. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties 
on its Nineteenth Session, Held in Warsawfrom 11 to 23 November 2013, art. 15, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (Jan. 31, 2014), http://unfccc.int/resource/ 
docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf [http://perma.cc/FA74-D4QK]. 
 130. UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 170. 
 131. Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 80(a); Rowena Maguire, Foundations 
of International Climate Law: Objectives, Principles and Methods, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE AND THE LAW, SUPRA NOTE 106, AT 83, 107; MCADAM, supra note 42, at 
232. 
 132. See RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
PREVENTION DUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 92–93 (2005). 
 133. UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 173. 
 134. Mace, supra note 126, at 63. 
 135. See UNFCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 173. 
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“incremental costs” entail.136  Mace argues that “incremental 
costs” refers to the cost in addition to actions necessary to address 
a national need and refers to the additional costs of more 
expensive environmental projects.137  Arguably, the costs of 
actions that support aims other than purely the need to address 
climate change impacts, or that would be implemented anyway 
with funding from other sources, are, in a strict sense, not 
incremental.138  This could be an obstacle in the context of 
climate-induced movement, which, as has been noted, is difficult 
to link purely with climate change impacts and arguably falls 
under funding and assistance from other sources, such as human 
rights frameworks. 
Article 4(4) offers some opportunities, since it establishes 
unlimited liability on the part of the developed country Parties to 
assist the developing country Parties that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting 
costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.139 Though the 
definition of adaptation measures is lacking under the UNFCCC, 
with the new Cancun Agreement in place, it can be concluded 
that population movement constitutes a form of adaptation 
strategy and therefore assistance should be provided in managing 
this migration, displacement, or planned relocation. 
Yet, the way in which Article 4(3) and 4(4) are formulated, 
using the terms “shall” and “assist” makes clear that there is no 
straight obligation for Annex II countries to bear the full costs of 
adaptation in all developing countries.140  Developed countries 
are only required to endeavour to assist developing countries that 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
 
 136. Susanne Olbrisch et al., Estimates of Incremental Investment for and Cost 
of Mitigation Measures in Developing Countries 11 CLIMATE POL’Y 970, 971 
(2011). 
 137. Mace, supra note 126, at 66. 
 138. VERHEYEN, supra note 132, at 97; see also MARCO GRASSO, JUSTICE IN 
FUNDING ADAPTATION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME 75 
(2010). 
 139. See UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 173; Mace, supra note 
126, at 64. 
 140. See UNFCCC, supra note 109, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 173. 
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change in meeting the cost of adaptation.141  This leaves 
developed states with a lot of room to manoeuvre.142 Even though 
the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in 
2010 made a positive contribution towards framing the issue of 
climate-induced movement and translated it into the obligations 
of states,143 it is still questionable to what extent this obligation 
is enforceable. The next session of the parties (COP 21) is 
expected to take place in December 2015 in Paris.144  The Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP) aims to reach an outcome document with legal force 
applicable to all Parties in order for it to be adopted at the COP 
21.145  The current proposal includes the commitment for the 
developed states to “assist in providing organized migration and 
planned relocation” which has taken place due to climate 
change.146  Should this provision gain legal force, the debate on 
climate-induced population movement will be greatly changed. 
However, whether this proposal will be accepted by the COP 21 
remains to be seen. 
4. Other Frameworks 
There are several other relevant instruments that can be 
discussed in relation to the issue of climate-induced population 
movement. As has been shown, in some cases climate change 
effects can lead to a conflict.147  In these cases, humanitarian law 
becomes relevant to climate-induced movement.148  
Humanitarian law, as is the case for human rights law, applies 
 
 141. RENÉ LEFEBER, Climate Change and State Responsibility, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE 322 (Rosemary Rayfuse & 
Shirley V. Scott eds., 2012). 
 142. See Rescuing Tuvaluans, supra note 1, at 268–70. 
 143. See Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 14. 
 144. See Nations Unies: Conférence sur les Changements Climatiques 2015, 
UNCCC,  http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/en/ [https://perma.cc/PZ57-8G7F].. 
 145. See generally Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, supra note 5. 
 146. Id. at 33. 
 147. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 148. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of the Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 17(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 49, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. 
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equally to all civilians affected by conflict and provides basic 
protection for those displaced during conflict.149  It is, however, 
ignorant to the reasons underlying the conflict and resulting 
displacement and provides no specific relief for people affected by 
climate change.150  As Kälin and Schrepfer skeptically note, the 
only way in which humanitarian law applies to the situation of 
movement due to climate change-induced conflict is when the 
country of refuge is a party to the conflict; otherwise, 
humanitarian law has no practical relevance in the protection of 
persons moving across borders.151 
Since there is a lot of speculation with regard to the “sinking 
islands” and disappearance of entire states, a question that is 
also discussed by academics and politicians is whether climate 
change can create a precedent of statelessness.152  However, it is 
mostly agreed that it is not likely that people from sinking 
islands will become stateless in a legal sense and will fall under 
protection of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless People.153  In that regard, Crawford concludes that 
there is “a strong presumption against the extinction of states.”154  
Even when territory as one of the elements of statehood 
disappears, it most likely will not lead to de jure statelessness, 
but rather de facto statelessness.155  The legal definition of 
“statelessness”, as McAdam argues, was meant “to apply only to 
de jure statelessness—premised on the denial of nationality 
through the operation of the law of a particular state,” and it does 
not extend to de facto stateless.156 
 
 149. See generally Geneva Convention, supra note 148. 
 150. Ben Saul & Jane McAdam, An Insecure Climate for Human Security? 
Climate-Induced Displacement and International Law 15 (Sydney Ctr. for Int’l 
L., Working Paper No. 4, 2008). 
 151. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 27–28. 
 152. See id. at 37–40; JANE MCADAM, ‘Disappearing States,’ Statelessness and 
the Boundaries of International Law, in CLIMATE CHANGE & DISPLACEMENT: 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 14, at 105, 105–30 [hereinafter 
Disappearing States]. 
 153. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, 
360 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter Stateless Persons Convention]. 
 154. JAMES R. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 715 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2006). 
 155. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 38. 
 156. Disappearing States, supra note 152, at 119. 
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III.  IDENTIFYING PRIORITIES FOR ACTIONS AND 
INTEGRATING OPPORTUNITIES 
This complex state of play demonstrates that conceptualizing 
the issue under one existing legal framework may not be possible 
and also not preferable. The main priorities for policy and action 
when it comes to climate-induced population movement are 
multifaceted and require an integrated approach and support of 
different legal tools and actors. Drawing upon the empirical and 
legal state-of-the-art research presented above, and the latest 
initiatives proposed by academics and policy-makers, it is possible 
to identify several priorities to be addressed in the context of 
population movement induced by climate change.157  While this 
list of priorities is not exhaustive, these are the most immediate 
tasks to be addressed by any future approach: 
 Human rights of people induced to move by climate 
change are at risk and have to be protected; 
 There is a need for a pre-emptive approach 
(adaptation strategies including those that prevent 
people from migrating, but also migration as an 
adaptation strategy, even in some cases as an end to 
adaptation); 
 While primarily responsibility lies with the affected 
state, international assistance is vital, since the 
affected states will in many cases lack the capacity to 
adapt. 
 There is a need for a regional-sensitive approach, 
since the problems associated with climate-induced 
movement, and the character of these movements, 
vary considerably depending on the region. 
 
As has been shown in Section 2.5, no legal framework can 
simultaneously address all these priorities. However, as this 
article will further demonstrate, there is an approach that allows 
 
 157. See Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 58–62; The Nansen Initiative, 
Cross-Border Displacement in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change: A 
Protection Agenda, 35–39 (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.nanseninitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/DRAFT-Nansen-Initiative-Protection-Agenda-for-
Consultation-08042015.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGF2-KF7R]; Preparing for a 
Warmer World, supra note 4; Sinking Islands, supra note 29, at 1186–1201. 
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for integrating the opportunities offered by different fragments of 
the legal system. This suggested approach is the adaptation 
approach, which originated in the Cancun Adaptation 
Framework. As noted above, for the purpose of this article, the 
adaptation approach to climate-induced population movement is 
defined as a proactive approach in which migration, 
displacement, and planned relocation are used as adaptation 
measures that allow people to adjust to a changing climate 
(through moving from places at risk).158  The benefits of the 
adaptation approach, and its potential in integrating the 
opportunities offered by various legal frameworks, are analyzed 
further. 
IV.  BENEFITS OF THE ADAPTATION APPROACH 
A.  A change of perspective 
First of all, the adaptation approach allows for drawing a line 
between refugees and people moving in response to climate 
change. It allows for viewing mobility as positive rather than as a 
problematic trend. It gives opportunities for vulnerable 
populations and frees people from the “refugee label” and the way 
they are treated and perceived. Rather than being victims of a 
situation, it grants the potential for adjusting to the new 
situation “with dignity”.159  It also allows for viewing the 
government of affected state as an ally in the process of 
adaptation, rather than the persecutor. States threatened by 
climate change are already showing an understanding of the 
importance of taking efforts to prepare for migration and enable 
it, so that it can indeed constitute adaptation and lead to a win-
win situation for sending and receiving areas.160 
 
 158. See supra Part I(A). 
 159. See Pacific Islanders Reject “Climate Refugee” Status, Want to “Migrate 
with Dignity,” SIDS Conference Hears, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Sept. 5, 2014 
10:52 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-05/pacific-islanders-reject-calls-
for-27climate-refugee27-status/5723078 [http://perma.cc/3SRE-RMQ5]. The 
most prominent example is the Pacific state Kiribati, where the government 
actively lobbies on the international level to ensure “migrat[ion] with dignity” 
for its citizens. See id. 
 160. Id. 
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However, “removing the stigma surrounding migration will 
not make climate change-induced population movement any less 
complex.”161  Ensuring that migration is adaptation rather than a 
failure to adapt162 will require careful supervision of the process 
and flexibility on the part of the adaptation approach. 
 
B.  Flexibility and Potential to Address the Risks 
Associated with Different Types of Mobility 
Through the adaptation approach different types of mobility 
can be addressed. The Cancun Agreement acknowledged that 
population movement in response to climate change can take 
three forms: migration, displacement, and planned relocation.163  
Each one of these forms addresses movement of a different nature 
(forced, voluntary), length (temporary, permanent), and distance 
(internal, cross-border). When these different forms are 
approached from the adaptation perspective, movement induced 
by climate change can be a means to adaptation (such as in the 
case with migration and temporary displacement), but also can be 
the end of adaptation (in cases with permanent displacement and 
planned relocation). 
This flexibility of the adaptation approach responds to the 
complex nature of movement induced by climate change and 
contributes to conceptualization of the issue, without a need to 
create a single definition or identify a single legal instrument 
applicable to the issue. It also allows for identifying the most 
crucial components for addressing each type of mobility. 
The Cancun Agreement acknowledged the potential of each 
type of mobility, regardless of their different nature, to have a 
positive influence on the capacity of communities to adapt to 
climate change.164  This potential varies for each type of mobility. 
 
 161. Lauren Nishimura, Climate Change Migrants: Impediments to a 
Protection Framework and the Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate 
Change Adaptation Strategies, 27 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 107, 130 (2015) 
[hereinafter Climate Change Migrants]. 
 162. Koko Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration: Governance 
Challenges, 20 GLOBAL ENVtL. CHANGE 402, 411–12 (2010). 
 163. See Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶ 14(f). 
 164. See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 12–15; see also Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 20. 
See generally GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 20; U.N. Secretary-General, 
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In some cases it can improve the economic situation of migrants 
and their families, helping them to increase their resilience to 
climate change and allowing people to stay longer, while in other 
cases the best outcome is that most human rights risks are 
avoided.165 
Therefore, it is crucial to acknowledge that population 
movement as an adaptation strategy has its limits.166  For each 
type of mobility, there are distinctive risks and concerns. As 
Barnett and Webber argue, for instance, “labour migration is the 
best way to use the power of migration to promote adaptation to 
climate change,”167 whereas displacement is more problematic as 
there are many immediate humanitarian needs to be satisfied.168  
Planned relocation, or, as it is also called, community 
resettlement, is the adaptation strategy that entails most 
risks.169  Nevertheless, the adaptation approach can be sensitive 
to these risks. 
Most of the risks, particularly when it comes to planned 
relocation and displacement, arise from the human rights 
perspective.170 As has been shown above, the human rights 
dimension of mitigation and adaptation policies is 
acknowledged.171  Furthermore, the warning has been made that 
even when the relevant law refers explicitly to human rights, 
there is still a danger that mitigation and adaptation policies may 
themselves undermine human rights.172  The adaptation 
framework, since it has recognized these humanitarian risks, is 
 
International Migration and Development, U.N. Doc A/69/207 (July 30, 2014); 
WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF 
REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION (2006); WARNER ET AL., supra note 26; Barnett & 
Webber, supra note 13. 
 165. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1; Barnett & Webber, supra note 13, at 
23–29 (warning that community resettlement “rarely leads to positive 
outcome”). 
 166. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 20. However, there is a way to 
minimize the risks with resettlement and planned relocation. See Revisiting 
Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 92–95. 
 167. Migration as Adaptation, supra note 14, at 42. 
 168. Id. at 48. 
 169. Id. at 43. 
 170. See Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1; Revisiting Planned Relocation, 
supra note 1, at 81. 
 171. See supra Part II(E)(2). 
 172. Migration as Adaptation, supra note 14, at 49–50. 
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more sensitive to human rights than the UNFCCC itself, and can 
address them. 
As identified above, the adaptation framework strongly relies 
on the human-rights based approach, which essentially reaffirms 
that the process of climate change decision-making does integrate 
human rights issues and places a human’s well-being at the core 
of a particular adaptation strategy.173  This means that the 
adaptation approach has potential to make migration, planned 
relocation, and, to some extent, resettlement a win-win situation 
for sending and receiving areas,174 while, at the same time, 
ensuring that the human rights of individuals are acknowledged 
and prioritized throughout the whole process of decision-making, 
implementation, and evaluation of adaptation strategies.175 
C.  Tools of the “Adaptation Approach” and Institutional 
Capacity 
Population movement as an adaptation strategy relies on the 
support of different legal frameworks and therefore can make use 
of the tools available under them. The fact that the Cancun 
Agreement is developed under the UNFCCC makes the tools of 
climate law relevant. The fact that the humanitarian 
consequences of climate change have been acknowledged makes 
tools available under human rights law, such as the human 
rights-based approach discussed above. Last, but not least, since 
adaptation takes the form of migration, migration law is relevant. 
These relevant frameworks are supported by a number of 
institutions, which further strengthens the adaptation approach. 
1. Climate Law Tools and Institutions 
a. Tools 
One of the central tools for adaptation within the UNFCCC is 
National Adaptation Programmes of Actions (NAPAs). NAPAs 
provide an opportunity for the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) 
to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and 
 
 173. Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 88–95. 
 174. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1. 
 175. See Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 92–95. 
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immediate needs with regard to adaptation to climate change.176  
For the LDCs, NAPAs are the first step towards financing and 
implementation of adaptation measures.177  The Cancun 
Adaptation Framework reemphasized the obligation of 
adaptation under Article 4(1)(b) of the UNFCCC, and invited 
Parties to cooperate regarding specific actions on the national, 
regional, and international levels when it comes to the issue of 
population movement due to climate change.178  It has also 
suggested for the first time that migration, displacement, and 
planned relocation can become part of National Adaptation Plans 
(NAPs).179  NAPs are different from NAPAs. The NAP process, 
established under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, enables 
Parties to formulate NAPs as a means of identifying medium- and 
long-term adaptation needs and developing and implementing 
strategies and programmes to address those needs. It builds upon 
the NAPA process, but, while the NAPA process was designed to 
produce one national adaptation programme of action, the NAP 
process has been designed to create a comprehensive system 
through which countries can integrate climate change adaptation 
into national planning and produce national adaptation plans on 
an ongoing basis.180  Ultimately, NAPs allow for a more coherent 
and comprehensive country-owned, and country-driven, process of 
adaptation.181  Apart from LDCs, developing-country Parties are 
also encouraged to begin preparation of their NAP process.182 
 
 176. National Adaptation Programmes of Action, UNFCCC (2014), 
http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/national_adaptation_programmes_of_a
ction/items/7567.php [http://perma.cc/8VB2-57ME]. 
 177. Gromilova & Jägers, supra note 1, at 19. 
 178. See Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶¶ 13–14. 
 179. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 50. 
 180. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, National Adaptation 
Plans: Technical Guidelines for the National Adaptation Process, at 15 (Dec. 
2012), 
http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/cancun_adaptation_framework/application/pdf/
naptechguidelines_eng_high__res.pdf [http://perma.cc/GFX9-JS25] [hereinafter 
National Adaptation Plans]. 
 181. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, The National 
Adaptation Plan Process: A Brief Overview, at 8 (Dec. 2012), http://unfccc.int/ 
files/adaptation/application/pdf/nap_overview.pdf [http://perma.cc/H464-DCKT]. 
 182. Non-LDC Info - National Adaptation Plans, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/ 
adaptation/workstreams/national_adaptation_plans/items/7596.php 
[http://perma.cc/5PPA-2QLN] (last updated Jan. 7, 2014). 
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The adaptation approach, therefore, more than ever, allows 
for a bottom-up approach, where the plan is developed on the 
national level but can at the same time be financially supported 
and coordinated on the international level. In that regard, the 
COP 16 created an Adaptation Committee and a Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation (SBI), and established a new Green Climate 
Fund, through which the new multilateral funding for adaptation 
should flow. 183 
So far, the acknowledgement of migration as a component of 
adaptation in NAPAs is, however, limited. The “Migration RPC’s 
Study”, an empirical study and comprehensive analysis of the 
forty-five NAPAs submitted to the UNFCCC by the end of 2010, 
reveals that migration is mainly recognized in NAPAs not as a 
coping strategy but rather as a negative side-effect of climate 
change.184  Of the forty-five NAPAs reviewed, only fourteen 
NAPAs proposed priority projects that involve the resettlement of 
communities or addressing issues of displacement, while thirteen 
NAPAs included priority projects that aim to limit rural out-
migration (especially rural-urban exodus), nine NAPAs included 
priority projects related to limiting transhumant migration, and 
one NAPA incorporated conflict-driven migration into its priority 
projects which focuses on resolution of the latter.185  Therefore, so 
far migration is not viewed as a means to adaptation, but rather 
as an ad hoc reaction to the impacts of climate change. When it 
comes to NAPs, the data and the way they develop are still 
lacking.186 
The fact that the majority of NAPAs still have a negative 
perception of migration on the national level runs counter to the 
general ambition set on the international level to use migration 
as an adaptation strategy that can boost development and 
contribute to resilience. Assistance in promoting and explaining 
the benefits of migration as an adaptation strategy is therefore 
 
 183. Cancun Agreements, supra note 6, ¶¶ 102–09. 
 184. Jon Sward & Samuel Codjoe, Human Mobility and Climate Change 
Adaptation Policy: a Review of Migration in National Adaptation Programmes of 
Action (NAPAs) 13 (Res. Programme Consortium, Working Paper No. 6, 2012). 
 185. Id. at 21–22. 
 186. See generally National Adaptation Plans, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/ 
adaptation/workstreams/national_adaptation_plans/items/6057.php 
[http://perma.cc/JM3N-LLGQ] (last updated Nov. 2, 2015). 
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vital. Although countries develop their NAPAs and NAPs 
themselves, they can also receive assistance from external actors. 
As set out by the UNFCCC, each country selects a Global 
Environmental Facility agency to provide technical assistance in 
planning and implementation of its NAPA.187 Additionally, the 
Least Developed Country Expert Group (LEG) is available to 
provide technical support and advice.188  The LEG will also 
provide technical guidance and support to the NAP process.189  
Therefore, a better understanding by these actors of the benefits 
and potential of migration as an adaptation strategy can help to 
change the understanding of migration in NAPAs and future 
NAPs and optimize the potential of migration. 
Furthermore, the “Migration RPC’s Study” reveals that even 
when NAPAs do refer to migration, they typically concern 
internal migration, as opposed to international migratory 
flows.190  This should also be addressed and further integrated, 
since cross-border movements are inevitable in some regions 
(including permanent relocation in the case of small island 
states). This challenges the current understanding of NAPAs and 
NAPs, which is limited to the national level, and may require 
adjustments. Such possible adjustment could be the inclusions in 
NAPAs and NAPs of provisions that stimulate and require the 
development of bilateral migration or planned relocation 
agreements between states. 
b. Institutional support 
The Cancun Agreement, developed within the UNFCCC 
context, brings the issue of climate-induced population movement 
within the forum that has the potential to address it. The 
UNFCCC has a vast membership and a lot of developing 
countries and least-developed countries, which are acknowledged 
hot-spots of climate-induced population movement, such as 
Bangladesh, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and many of the affected African 
 
 187. Sward & Codjoe, supra note 184, at 8. 
 188. Id. at 9. 
 189. National Adaptation Plans, supra note 180, at 7. 
 190. Sward & Codjoe, supra note 184, at 7. 
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states.191  Furthermore, the UNFCCC regime is built upon the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which 
makes it attractive for these vulnerable states to rely on the 
support of this regime. 
The institutional regime under the UNFCCC is already 
established, with several mechanisms and funds relevant to 
adaptation. Among the mechanisms are: the Adaptation 
Committee established at COP 16,192 the Nairobi work 
programme (NWP) established at COP 12,193 the Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation (SBI) established at COP 1,194 and the 
Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage 
associated with Climate Change Impacts established at the COP 
19.195 
There are four funds relevant to adaptation under the 
UNFCCC: the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), the 
Adaptation Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and 
the Green Climate Fund. Though these funds have often been 
criticized for their inadequacy,196 as McAnaney notes, most states 
still participate in the UNFCCC funding mechanisms.197 
In that regard, the advantage of bringing the issue of 
climate-induced population movement under the UNFCCC 
adaptation agenda is that besides the interest in the regime by 
the developing countries, many developed states also remain 
 
 191. Status of Ratification of the Convention, UNFCCC, https://unfccc.int/ 
essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php 
[http://perma.cc/B8FP-SAXH]. 
 192. Adaptation Committee, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/bodies/adaptation_ 
committee/body/6968.php [http://perma.cc/T6JY-H7HN]. 
 193. FOCUS: Adaptation, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/focus/adaptation/items/ 
6999.php [http://perma.cc/6MSJ-RLL6]. 
 194. See Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), UNFCCC, 
http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6406.php [https://perma.cc/KL77-BK5W]. 
 195. See Approaches to Address Loss and Damage Associated with Climate 
Change Impacts in Developing Countries Particularly Vulnerable to the Adverse 
Effects of Climate Change, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/ 
loss_and_damage/items/6056.php [http://perma.cc/E7Y8-2DCH]. 
 196. Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 77. According to Climate 
Funds Update, there is USD 1.22 billion available to support all projects and 
programmes, while the World Bank Group estimated in 2010 that “the costs of 
adaptation to climate change in developing countries are . . . in the range of 
USD 75 to USD 100 billion a year between 2010 and 2050.” Id. 
 197. Sinking Islands, supra note 29, at 1207. 
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supportive of the regime.198  Addressing population movement in 
response to climate change through the established adaptation 
regime is probably also politically feasible.199  Although it is not 
likely that states will agree on binding obligations, the parties to 
the UNFCCC have agreed on adaptation goals and 
commitments.200  As statistics show, developed states are willing 
to provide aid.201  Furthermore, the potential of strengthening 
existing funds, so that they can extend to migration as an 
adaptation strategy, seems more realistic than the creation of 
entirely new funds. 
2. Human Rights Law Tools and Institutions 
a. Tools 
The emergence of the human rights-based approach to 
climate change, as discussed above in Section 2.5.2 and Section 3, 
is a significant development, which reaffirms that the process of 
climate change decision-making does integrate human rights 
issues and places a human’s well-being at the core of a particular 
adaptation strategy. In particular, the human rights-based 
approach can ensure that during the process of planning, 
implementation, and evaluation of migration, displacement, or 
planned relocation as adaptation strategies, the human rights of 
the people involved are prioritized and secured. 
b. Institutional support 
As previously stated, the Cancun Agreement has confirmed 
the link between human rights law and climate law. Human 
rights institutions and treaty bodies therefore play an important 
role when it comes to ensuring that adaptation to climate change 
takes human rights into account. The Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and, in particular, 
 
 198. Rescuing Tuvaluans, supra note 1, at 262. 
 199. Sinking Islands, supra note 29, at 1207. 
 200. See, e.g., Cancun Agreements, supra note 6. 
 201. Contributor Countries, CLIMATE FUNDS UPDATE, 
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/global-trends/donor-countries 
[http://perma.cc/J7MU-A3Z9] (depicting relative sizes of contributions by 
country). 
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the Human Rights Council, have acknowledged the importance of 
the link, especially when it comes to adaptation.202  Therefore, 
with the help of the committees and agencies available under the 
human rights regime,203 the “rights-based approach” to climate 
change actions, including adaptation strategies, can be 
implemented. 
There are a number of human rights supervisory bodies that 
have been tasked with overseeing compliance with human rights 
treaties. Such supervisory bodies as the Human Rights 
Committee (CCPR); the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR); the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC); and the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) can 
play a crucial role in monitoring human rights violations related 
to climate-induced population movement and in some cases can 
consider individual complaints.204 
In addition, although people induced to move by climate 
change do not fall under the mandate of the Office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UNHCR 
nevertheless plays an important role. First of all, the UNHCR has 
been constantly bringing attention to the issue of climate-induced 
migration and to the existing legal gap in that regard.205  Second, 
the UNHCR has experience in creating and lobbing for relevant 
instruments, such as the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement,206 which can considerably support an adaptation 
framework.207  Furthermore, the expertise of the High 
Commissioner in view of emergencies, as well as its legal and 
 
 202. Revisiting Planned Relocation, supra note 1, at 81. 
 203. See Int’l Council on Human Rights Policy, Climate Change and Human 
Rights: A Rough Guide, at 9–11 (2008). 
 204. See Jane Connors & Markus Schmidt, United Nations, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 359, 377–87 (Moeckli, et al. eds., 2010). 
 205. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 53. 
 206. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep. of the Representative of the 
Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, Submitted Pursuant to Comm’n 
Resolution 1997/39: Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
U.N. DOC. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998). 
 207. Climate Change and Displacement: Identifying Gaps and Responses, 
Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement (Feb. 22–26, 
2011), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9f22b32.html [http://perma.cc/ 
8CBJ-S62G] [hereinafter Summary of Deliberations]; see also Kälin & Schrepfer, 
supra note 8, at 53. 
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technical expertise in dealing with refugee crisis, will be 
important.208 
Last, but not least, the UNHCR is supporting some of the 
most recent and also most promising soft-law initiatives. Since 
paragraph 14(f) of the Cancun Agreement did not suggest how 
climate-induced population movement should be addressed, the 
“UNHCR took the initiative to bring together a group of experts . 
. . to discuss options for addressing” the issue.209  This group of 
experts is referred to as the roundtable of experts on climate 
change and displacement, and was organized by the UNHCR in 
2011.210  It highlighted the need for a global guiding framework 
for external displacement not covered by the current refugee 
regime.211  This roundtable informed the Nansen Conference on 
Climate Change and Displacement, and resulted in the Nansen 
Principles.212  Principle 9 stressed the need for a more coherent 
international approach “to meet the protection needs of people 
displaced externally owing to sudden-onset disaster” and 
proposed that “states, working in conjunction with UNHCR and 
other relevant stakeholders, could develop a guiding framework 
or instruments in this regard.”213  It has also led to the Nansen 
initiative, launched by Norway and Switzerland in October 
2012.214  The Nansen Initiative is a bottom-up, state-led 
consultative process with multi-stakeholder involvement, and has 
an overall goal of building consensus among states on key 
principles and elements to protect people displaced across borders 
in the context of disasters caused by natural hazards, including 
those linked to climate change.215  Though the Nansen Initiative 
is not an attempt to suggest a legal framework and the Nansen 
Principles are not a soft-law instrument,216 it certainly improves 
 
 208. Preparing for a Warmer World, supra note 4, at 79. 
 209. Walter Kälin, From the Nansen Principles to the Nansen Initiative, 41 
FORCED MIGRATION REV. 48, 49 (2012). 
 210. Summary of Deliberations, supra note 207, at 1. 
 211. Id. 
 212. NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, The Nansen Conference: Climate Change 
and Displacement in the 21st Century, AT 5, (June 5–7, 2011). 
 213. Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 8, at 55. 
 214. About us, THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, http://www.nanseninitiative.org/ 
secretariat/ [http://perma.cc/9R4N-FWLA]. 
 215. Kälin, supra note 209, at 49. 
 216. Id. 
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understanding of the issue and can further support the 
adaptation approach initiated by the UNFCCC. The UNHCR, 
which plays an active role in Nansen Initiative,217 can therefore 
further positively influence the development of understanding 
and further promoting the importance of the issue in the 
international arena. 
3. Migration Law Tools and Institutions 
a. Tools 
The adaptation approach reveals the links between 
adaptation policies and migration policies. Migration policies can 
be a tool of the adaptation approach.218  Examples of migration 
schemes in the Pacific, namely New Zealand’s Recognized 
Seasonal Employer Scheme (RSE) and Australia’s Seasonal 
Worker Program (SWP), demonstrate that migration schemes can 
be an effective tool in boosting adaptation in developing countries, 
allowing them to increase resilience and development.219  Such 
schemes can be essential tools for managing different types of 
mobility as a form of adaptation. 
Temporary (seasonal) labour migration schemes, for instance, 
can be successful tools when it comes to migration as a form of 
adaptation to climate change.220  Remittances sent back home, in 
addition to the knowledge and technologies gained during 
seasonal migration, contribute to the improvement of the 
economic situation, giving opportunities to implement adaptation 
measures and to increase the resilience of households.221  When it 
comes to displacement, specific migration schemes that offer 
immediate temporary labour opportunities for displaced people 
can have the same positive impact, allowing people to restore 
their homes and livelihoods and to return to their country 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1; see also PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, 
at 24. 
 219. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See, e.g., IPCC 2007, supra note 3, at 373, 728; Neil Adger et al., 
Migration, Remittances, Livelihood Trajectories, and Social Resilience, 31 J. 
HUMAN ENV’T 358, 359 (2002); Barnett & Webber, supra note 11, at 22. 
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faster.222  When migration is an end to adaptation and takes a 
form of planned relocation/resettlement, specific labour schemes 
for relocated people can also ensure that planned relocation is 
successful, since people are given the economic basis for a fresh 
start. 
There are numerous conditions required for labour schemes 
to contribute positively to adaptation.223  There should be a 
mechanism to prioritize hiring people from countries affected by 
climate change and a mechanism that can ensure that the gains 
of participation in labour programmes are actually going into 
climate change adaptation measures. Furthermore, migration 
schemes should support existing patterns of migration, so that 
people migrate to places where there is a cultural or historical 
connection (such as language or already established communities 
of migrants). 
b. Institutional support 
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) are other institutions 
that are relevant and that can further strengthen the adaptation 
approach to climate-induced displacement. As has been already 
identified, migration, particularly labour migration, can 
constitute a form of adaptation that benefits all parties involved. 
IOM might not be a suitable body to protect people induced to 
move due to climate change,224 but it can facilitate international 
cooperation on migration and further promote the understanding 
of migration as an adaptation strategy. As McAdam has noted, 
IOM is already trying to take an agenda-setting role on the 
issue.225  Piguet quotes IOM’s statement that “international 
community is, in fact, ignoring labour mobility as a coping 
 
 222. See Migration as Adaptation, supra note 14, at 48. 
 223. Lessons from Oceania, supra note 1. 
 224. MCADAM, supra note 44, at 229. 
 225. Id. at 229–30. See generally Int’l Org. for Migration, IOM Outlook on 
Migration, Environment and Climate Change (2014) [hereinafter IOM Outlook 
on Migration]; Int’l Org. for Migration, Compendium of IOM's Activities in 
Migration, Climate Change and the Environment (2009); Int’l Org. for Migration, 
Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence (2009). 
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strategy for climate stress.”226  In fact, in its latest report, IOM 
Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change, the 
IOM pronounces its devotion to advocate for the capacity of 
migration to be an adaptation strategy through “continu[ing] its 
advocacy efforts together with its partners on the inclusion of 
human mobility within the post-Kyoto agreement,” raising 
awareness and understanding of the positive ways mobility can 
contribute to climate change adaptation, and ensuring that 
adequate funding is made available.227 
ILO is playing an increasingly important role in enhancing 
the capacity of states affected by climate change to maximize the 
benefits of migration.228  The ILO’s expertise will also be 
extremely important when it comes to promoting a human rights-
based approach to migration as an adaptation strategy, since ILO 
generally aims to promote rights at work, encourage decent 
employment opportunities, enhance social protection, and 
strengthen dialogue on work-related issues.229  Furthermore, the 
UNFCCC and the ILO are committed to strengthening their 
collaboration and mobilization of constituents in support of an 
ambitious and successful global climate change agreement.230 
D.  Towards an Integrative Approach 
Last, but not least, the adaptation approach allows for 
integrating the opportunities offered by the frameworks identified 
above and for building a mutually supportive system of tools and 
institutions that can address the main priorities identified in the 
context of climate-induced population movement. 
 
 226. PIGUET ET AL., supra note 12, at 24; Int’l Org. for Migration, World 
Migration Report 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global 
Economy, at 399 (2008). 
 227. IOM Outlook on Migration, supra note 224, at 66–69. 
 228. See Enhancing the Capacity of Pacific Island Countries to Address the 
Impacts of Climate Change on Migration, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/projects/WCMS_226212/lang--
en/index.htm [http://perma.cc/V8A5-U7W2]. 
 229. Mission and Objectives, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/ 
about-the-ilo/mission-and-objectives/lang--en/index.htm [http://perma.cc/48PX-
UARQ]. 
 230. Climate Change, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/ 
green-jobs/news/WCMS_302556/lang--en/index.htm [http://perma.cc/EM2B-
84W9]. 
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1. The first priority identified is the importance of 
protecting the human rights of people during 
migration, displacement, or planned relocation due 
to climate change. 
Technical management of adaptation strategies (such as the 
drafting of plans and their implementation and evaluation) takes 
place under the UNFCCC agenda. As has been demonstrated, the 
UNFCCC has institutions and actors with sufficient expertise to 
carry this out. Treating population movement in response to 
climate change as an adaptation strategy also allows for 
complementing the technical expertise of the UNFCCC with the 
expertise accumulated under the human rights framework. 
Policy-makers have acknowledged the importance of applying the 
human rights-based approach to adaptation. The human rights-
based approach helps to focus on how to ensure that human 
rights are taken into account during the whole process of 
migration, displacement, and planned relocation. The human 
rights-based approach can be integrated into the technical 
process of decision-making, implementation, and evaluation of 
adaptation strategies, such as during preparation, 
implementation, and evaluation of NAPAs and NAPs. 
2. The second priority identified is the need for a pre-
emptive approach. 
In this regard, the precautionary principle established under 
the UNFCCC is central. As identified above, population 
movement can be both a means and an end to adaptation. When 
migration or displacement is a means to adaptation, it can be 
used to increase the resilience of places affected by climate 
change, to cease a stress on the environment, or to contribute to 
adaptation programmes through remittances. For example, this 
can be done through developing migration schemes and/or 
incorporating plans for displacement within NAPAs and NAPs. 
The precautionary principle is also relevant when movement 
is an end to adaptation (planned relocation as an adaptation 
strategy). The precautionary principle can ensure that even when 
there is not enough scientific certainty about the time a certain 
area will be dramatically affected by climate change, actions must 
be taken to relocate people. The human rights-based approach 
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/1
GROMILOVA_FINAL 5/3/2016  5:20 PM 
2016] POTENTIAL OF THE “ADAPTATION APPROACH” 153 
can greatly compliment planned relocation as an adaptation 
strategy, since it can make sure that relocation is sensitive to the 
human rights risks for relocated people and people from receiving 
areas. 
3. The third priority is the availability of 
international assistance. 
As has been demonstrated, both human rights law and 
climate law require developed states to provide assistance to 
developing states. The extent and character of this assistance, 
however, is not clear. Acknowledgement of migration, 
displacement, and planned relocation as climate change 
adaptation strategies requires recognition of the humanitarian 
consequences of climate change. This allows for a different angle 
of looking at the obligations regarding assistance and cooperation 
in adaptation. Accordingly, the norms of climate law can be seen 
and interpreted in conjunction with human rights norms.231  One 
the one hand, the focus on individuals and their human rights 
lays down the baseline against which to measure the extent and 
scope of assistance required in terms of adaptation under Article 
4 of the UNFCCC. This means that while it is hard to establish 
which adaptation measures are required for individuals in the 
context of climate law alone (since the UNFCCC process is 
technical and scientist-led), this question gets more clarity when 
human rights concerns are involved. People in affected areas 
should get assistance in adaptation, at least to an extent that the 
negative human rights implications are diminished or prevented. 
On the other hand, when the matter of assistance is approached 
from the climate law perspective, the precautionary principle 
comes forward. Therefore, there is no need to wait for human 
rights violations when there are clear environmental concerns. 
This strengthens a human rights duty to fulfill (through 
international assistance and cooperation), since it can be claimed 
that the duty to fulfill arises where there are serious concerns 
(regardless of scientific uncertainty) that a country requires 
adaptation to climate change through migration, displacement, or 
planned relocation. 
 
 231. Limon, supra note 102, at 452. 
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Another advantage of looking at the matter of international 
assistance from the adaptation perspective is that the adaptation 
approach helps to clarify not only when the rights should be 
fulfilled (through proactive provision of assistance in adaptation), 
but also who should provide this assistance. The principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities established in climate 
law can strengthen the principle of international assistance 
under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. While there is a lot of 
scepticism about the extraterritoriality of human rights 
obligations, climate law highlights that global issues cannot be 
approached from a traditional territorial focus, but require 
cooperation. As Limon suggests, the principle of common but 
differentiated can reshape international human rights law and 
make it more responsive to the inequalities of the globalized 
world.232  This shows that the adaptation approach allows for use 
of human rights law and climate law as mutually supportive 
frameworks and can help to achieve more than each of these 
domains of law could achieve alone. 
4. The fourth priority is a need for a regionally 
sensitive approach 
NAPAs and NAPs are the most relevant instruments in that 
regard, since they are the most prominent bottom-up tools when 
it comes to adaptation. Furthermore, as has been shown above, 
migration schemes can also be tools that support adaptation at 
the regional level. When these schemes are appropriately 
developed, they will allow people to migrate within “comfortable” 
routes and make migration, displacement, or planned relocation a 
more successful story from the human rights perspective. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
The issue of climate-induced population movement is greatly 
important, with many risks involved and many questions 
regarding obligations, protection, and responsibilities remaining 
unanswered. The complex nature of the issue continuously 
challenges policy-makers and law-makers. International law 
 
 232. Id. at 474–75. 
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remains fragmented and does not offer a clear way to 
conceptualize the issue. 
While, at the moment, international law remains limited in 
its capacity to address the issue of climate-induced population 
movement, there are also developments that do have potential. 
As this article has demonstrated, the fact that the Cancun 
Adaptation Agreement has acknowledged migration, 
displacement, and planned relocation as adaptation strategies is 
a positive development. It was argued that this step in legislation 
allows for developing an adaptation approach, which has 
numerous benefits in effectively addressing priorities central for 
climate-induced population movement. The legal analysis also 
showed that this approach allows the integration of the 
opportunities offered by distinct legal frameworks. Furthermore, 
this shows the interlinkages within the fragmented international 
law. 
In particular, the adaptation approach has the following 
strengths: it allows for addressing the issue of climate-induced 
population movement in a proactive way (since it relies on the 
precautionary principle); it can ensure that the human rights of 
people involved are at the core of planning, implementation, and 
evaluation of adaptation strategies (through the human rights-
based approach); it suggests tools that can make migration, 
displacement, and planned relocation a more successful process 
(through specifically developed migration schemes and programs, 
NAPAs and NAPs); and it emphasises the obligations of 
developed countries (those who have contributed the most to 
climate change) to provide assistance in adaptation (this 
assistance follows from both human rights and climate law 
frameworks). 
An understanding of the benefits of treating climate-induced 
population movements as a matter of adaptation must be further 
strengthened and integrated into the international agenda. 
Currently, the draft proposal that will be discussed at the COP 21 
in December 2015 in Paris includes the commitment for the 
developed states to “assist in providing organized migration and 
planned relocation” due to climate change.233  This provision 
appears under the loss and damage framework and envisages 
 
 233. Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, supra note 5, at 33. 
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assistance in response to loss and damage occurred due to 
extreme events and slow-onset climate events. However, when it 
comes to adaptation to climate change, migration, displacement, 
and planned relocation are not included in the proposal. Although 
acceptance of the provision under the loss and damage framework 
will no doubt make a great contribution to the climate-induced 
migration debate, this will not support an adaptation approach. 
The important priorities identified for addressing the issue of 
climate-induced population movement include not only reactive 
measures (when loss and damage have already occurred). As has 
been shown, the pro-active approach is vital for both successful 
adaptation and effective protection of human rights. Therefore, it 
is crucial when looking at migration, displacement, and planned 
relocation to not only focus on loss and damage but also (and 
primarily) to focus on how these strategies can be promoted, 
managed, and integrated into the adaptation framework. The 
adaptation approach to climate-induced population movement 
has an important implication for the post-Kyoto negotiations. It is 
therefore highly advisable that population movement as a climate 
change adaptation strategy be developed further in the proposals 
for the COP 21. 
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